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Estimation of Imperfect Competition in Food Marketing:
A Dynamic Analysis  of the German Banana Market
Satish Y. Deodhar and Ian M. Sheldon
Several  studies have estimated the welfare effects of recent changes in the European
Union's common policy on banana imports, based upon the assumption that the market is
perfectly competitive. However, if the market is imperfectly competitive, predictions
about changes in banana policy may be inaccurate. The objective of this paper is to
estimate the degree of market imperfection in the German market for banana imports
using dynamic methods. The hypothesis that this market is perfectly competitive is
rejected, and, in addition, the degree of market imperfection  is estimated to be higher
using a dynamic model compared to previous static estimates.
A key feature  of much of the research in  in-  time periods. In addition, a dynamic framework is
dustrial  organization  over  the  past  decade  has  appropriate  where  there  are  substantial  adjust-
been  the  application  of  non-cooperative  game-  ment  costs  in  changing  production from  one  pe-
theoretic  methods  to the  analysis  of imperfectly  riod to another (Karp and Perloff, 1993a).
competitive markets (see  Tirole,  1989). While the  In this paper, the degree of non-competitive-
use  of the Nash  equilibrium  to  solve  static  one-  ness  in the German  market for banana  imports  is
period  games has focused  attention on the stabil-  estimated using a linear-quadratic  dynamic  game
ity  of  oligopolistic  outcomes  such  as  Cournot-  model, originally  developed  by Karp and Perloff
Nash, perhaps  the most important  advance  made  (1989,  1993a,  1993b).  A  dynamic  conjectural
in the field has  been the ability to analyze multi-  variations  parameter is estimated, where the con-
period games that have oligopolistic  equilibria. In  jectural  variations  parameter  nests  the  well-
particular, it has been shown that non-cooperative  known  market  structures  of perfect  competition,
collusive  equilibria  can  be  obtained  in  repeated  Cournot-Nash  and  collusion.  The  methodology
games (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1989).  used  in  the  current  paper  contrasts  with  earlier
Parallel  to  these  theoretical  developments  work by Deodhar and Sheldon (1995)  which used
has been the evolution of the so-called  "new em-  a version of the static model  developed by Bres-
pirical industrial  organization"  (NEIO).  Research  nahan (1982)  to generate  an  industry-wide,  aver-
under  the  rubric  of  the  NEIO  uses  structural  age  parameter  of market  power  in  the  German
econometric  models to estimate market power  in  banana import sector.
a  given  industry  (Bresnahan  and  Schmalensee,  The German market  for banana  imports was
1987).  Most  NEIO  studies  have  focused  on  do-  chosen for this study for three reasons.  First, three
mestic markets,  and, moreover,  estimate a market  multinational  firms  dominate  the market (United
power  parameter  within  a  static  framework  (see  Brands,  Standard Fruit and Noboa) accounting  for
Bresnahan,  1989;  Perloff,  1992).  Given  the  pre-  about 72 percent of the market (McCorriston  and
dictions of repeated game analysis, this procedure  Sheldon,  1996).  This  apparently  oligopolistic
may be inappropriate if firms interact over several  market  structure  derives  largely  from  the  exis-
tence  of economies  of scale  in  refrigerated  ship-
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changes  in  the  European  Union's  (EU)  banana  When modeling oligopolistic markets  as dy-
import  regime  (Read,  1994).  While  existing  namic games, two important equilibrium concepts
studies  of the impact  of this  regime  assume  per-  are  commonly  used:  open-loop  and  feedback
fect competition  (Borrell  and  Yang,  1990,  1992;  Nash  equilibrium.  In  an  open-loop  equilibrium,
Borrell,  1994),  recent  analysis  of the  effects  of  controls (i.e. moves made by a firm that constitute
trade  policy  in  the  presence  of  oligopoly  its strategy),  are a function of time and the initial
(Helpman  and  Krugman,  1989)  suggests  that  state.  Since  moves are  independent of the current
there  is  a  premium  on  verifying  empirically  state of the system, and a firm  is committed  to  a
whether or not the banana export market is imper-  preannounced  plan  not anticipating any response,
fectly competitive.  this  equilibrium  is  not  subgame  perfect.  A  sub-
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  lin-  game perfect  equilibrium  is  one where there  is  a
ear-quadratic  dynamic model  used is described  in  Nash  equilibrium  for  the  whole  game,  and  the
Section  2.  Essentially,  this  description  involves  firms'  strategies are a Nash equilibrium for every
the  estimation  of a  demand  function for  banana  sub-period  within the  game.  Fixing  strategies  at
imports  in Germany,  and  a Markov  equation that  the start of a game would clearly not be subgame
captures  the  strategic  interaction  among  firms,  perfect, if a firm  subsequently  wanted  to change
based  either on open-loop  or feedback  strategies.  that strategy in response to other firms'  strategies.
The parameters  of these equations  are  then used  In  this  sense,  the  open-loop  equilibrium  is  the
in the solution  to  a dynamic  programming  prob-  dynamic  analog  of the  static  Nash  equilibrium
lem  in  order  to  derive  a  dynamic  conjectural  where  firms assume  the output  choices  of oppo-
variations  parameter.  The  data  used  to  estimate  nents as given.
the  above  parameters  and  the  results  of  the  In contrast,  in  a feedback  equilibrium,  play-
econometric  analysis  are  reported  and  discussed  ers design their optimal  policies as decision  rules
in  Section  3.  Implications  of  the  analysis  are  dependent on the current state of the game. Since
given in Section 4.  current state variables summarize the  latest avail-
able  information  about  the  system,  and  since
A Linear-Quadratic Dynamic  Game  firms  take the mechanism  for determining  future
behavior  as  given, feedback  strategies  can be re-
In  the  present  paper,  the  degree  of market  ferred  to  as  Markov  strategies  and  a  feedback
power enjoyed by the top three firms in the Ger-  equilibrium can be  considered  a subgame perfect
man  market  for  banana  imports  is  evaluated  by  equilibrium.  The  Markov  equation  is  given  as qt
estimating  a  dynamic  conjectural  variations  pa-  = Gqtl, which depicts the linear decision rules for
rameter (Riordan,  1985) in the context of a linear-  the firms, where  qt is the output vector of firms at
quadratic  dynamic  model.  The  term  linear-  time  t.  It  should  be  noted  at this  point  that the
quadratic  comes from optimal control theory, and  adjustment paths  for the open-loop  and feedback
refers to  a problem  where the  objective  function  equilibria  are  the same  for the  limiting  cases  of
is  quadratic  and  the  constraints  are  linear.  The  perfect competition and  collusion with symmetric
linear-quadratic  approach  has  frequently  been  firms (see Karp  and Perloff,  1993a). Another  ad-
used  in  theoretical  models  of  oligopoly  vantage of using the linear-quadratic  approach  is
(Fershtman  and  Kamien,  1987;  Reynolds,  1987;  that open-loop and  feedback  strategies  can easily
Dockner,  1992; and Karp and Perloff, 1993a), and  be easily compared.
has  been used  in recent  empirical  work by Karp  Given  the  open-loop  strategy,  and  three
and Perloff (1989;  1993b). A particular advantage  symmetric  firms  in  the  German  banana  market,
to  using  this  approach  is  that  closed-form  solu-  the  objective  (profit)  function  of an  individual
tions can be found for the equilibria of differential  firm  over  an  infinite time-horizon  is assumed  to
games,  and, hence,  it is possible to solve analyti-  take the following form:
cally  for  the  conjectural  variations  parameter  1
(Dockner,  1992;  Karp  and Perloff,  1993c).  Trac- 
table numerical  solutions  to non-linear  problems  p-] [(Pt-0i-OJ5i qi)qt-(oi+0.5iuit)uit]
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mates for the elements  of  Vi,  the  number of un-
where Pt is the German retail price of bananas  in  known  parameters  exceeding  the  number  of
period t, qit  is the quantity of bananas exported to  equations.
Germany  by  the  ith  firm  in  period  t,  uit  is  the  As mentioned earlier, the open-loop  strategy
change in exports of firm i from period t-1 to pe-  concept  is naive, and, therefore, it is necessary to
riod t, and 13  is the discount factor. The term (0i  +  incorporate  a subgame  perfect  feedback  strategy.
0.5 iqit)qit  represents  the  quadratic  production  The  value  function  method  of  dynamic  pro-
cost,  and  (Coi  +  0.55iuit) ui  represents  quadratic  gramming is used to set up the dynamic objective
production adjustment costs.  The inverse  demand  function  for  this  kind  of firm  behavior.  If the
function Pt is assumed to take a linear form:  value of the present  and discounted  future profits
of firm i can be expressed as  Ji(qt,  Vi), where  Vi
n  is  defined  as  above,  then  firm  i's  dynamic  pro-
(2)  Pt=  a - b  it=  a-bQt  gramming  profit  maximization  problem  can  be
i-l  written as:
Converting  the objective  function (1) into matrix  (4)
form,  and  deriving  the  first-order-condition  re-)  max[(
strictions,  gives the following matrix equation:  Jit-'Vi)  m  t -i  - 0  it)  it
- (o i + 0.  iuit) uit + P Ji (q  ,Vi)].
(3)  KiVi = [G-I(I-G)(I-93G)' ei8i
Converting  this  objective  function  into  matrix
Ki is defined as b(ee'i + eie') +  ieie', where  b and  form,  and  deriving  the  first-order-condition  re-
4i  are  the  demand  slope  and  production  adjust-  strictions gives the following matrix equation:
ment  parameters  respectively,  ei  is  a  column
vector with  1 in the  i  row and  zeros  elsewhere,  [Ki + P Wi + (eie'i  + P  X)  i)5  'V  i
and e is a column vector with  1 in each row.  Vi is  (5)  = [G']-  i
a three into one column  vector with one  in the  i  i
row and  V„  and  Vik  in the remaining rows, where
Vi is defined as duidui,, and similarly Vk . G is a  Again, no symmetry assumptions  are required for
3x3 matrix that establishes the relation between q,  deriving  this  condition,  however,  the  symmetry
and q  t,.  requirements  used  in the  open-loop  case  are  in-
troduced here too. In  deriving  equation  (3),  no  symmetry  as-  troducedheretoo.
sumptions  are  made,  however,  for  analytical  Matrix  equations  (3)  and  (5)  have  two  un-
tractability,  symmetry  is introduced  at this stage.  knowns,  the  conjectural  variations  parameter  V
Specifically, it is asumed  that Vy=VWi,j; 5i=,=i;  and the  cost of adjustment  parameter  §. The  rest
and  G  is  symmetric  such  that  elements  of the matrices  in these equations are expressed in
Giagli=j;  Gis=g 2 siyj.  The dynamic  conjectural  terms of the  slope  parameter  of the  inverse  de-
variations  parameter  V ranges  from  -l/(n-l)  for  mand function,  b, and  a lagged coefficient  matrix
the  case  of perfect  competition,  where  n  is  the  G from the Markov  equation.  Specifically,  matrix
number of firms, through  0 for Cournot-Nash,  to  is  expressed  in  terms  of b,  matrix  Xi  is  ex-
1 for  perfect  collusion,  the  same  range  as  in  a  pressed  in terms of G, and matrix Wi  is expressed
static  framework. It should be noted that treating  in ters  both b and G.  Therefore,  it is  neces-
firms as having similar conjectures  is a relatively  sary to estimate the matrix G, and recover the pa-
restrictive  assumption,  implying  that  firms  have  rameter  b  in order  to solve  matrix  equations  (3)
similar  cost  structures.  Unfortunately,  it  is  not  and (5)  for V and  . In both cases,  Vis a function
possible  computationally  to derive  separate  esti-  o  G  one,  and  o  s a  untion o  ot  andG.
For the  open-loop  case,  a unique  solution exists
for  V;  however,  for  the feedback  case,  there  are
The  derivations  of these equations  and their  solutions  are  two  solutions  that  emerge  from  solving  a quad-
available  from  the authors. They  are  also  available  in  Karp  ratic  equation  in  V.  One  solution  is  close  to the
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open-loop  value,  and  the  other is  infeasible  (see  the period 1970-1992  from the Food and Agricul-
the  Appendix  for the exact  derivations  of V and  ture Organization  (FAO) publications:  World Ba-
5). The procedure followed in estimating b and G  nana  Economy  (1983)  and  Banana  Statistics
is outlined in the next section.  (1992).  Data  on the  retail  price  of oranges  (O,)
were  collected  from  the  FAO  Production  Year-
Empirical Analysis  book,  and  German  income  data  were  collected
from  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)
Estimation of  Demand  Equation  publication:  International  Financial  Statistics
(1992,  1994).  The demographic  variable  (Z,)  was
In order to estimate the parameter  b, a linear  collected  from  Warnes  (1993),  and the  Interna-
demand  function  was  specified  initially  for  the  tional  Labour  Office  (ILO)  publication:  From
German banana market as follows:  Pyramid to Pillar (1989).3 The German  consumer
price  index  used  for  deflating  the  nominal  vari-
Qt  o  = a o+IalPt  +a2  Ot +a3Yt  ables,  with  a  base  year  of  1985,  was  collected
(6)  from  International  Financial  Statistics  (1992,
+ a4Zt +a5  T+ a6 TT+  t  1994).
Ordinary  Least  Squares  (OLS),  based  on
Qt  represents  the  total  quantity  of bananas  im-  Shazam (Version 7.0,  1993), was used to estimate
ported  annually  into  Germany  over  the  period  (6).  The  results  of  the  final  estimation,  from
1970-1992  and Pt represents  the real  retail  price  which the estimate of b was chosen, are presented
of bananas.  Ot is the real retail price of oranges, a  in Table  1, indicating  that the  R-square between
substitute  fruit for  bananas;  Y,  is real  per capita  observed  and  predicted  is  0.95.  The  parameter
GNP  for  Germany;  Zt  is  the  German  population  estimate  for Pt is -0.33  which is significant at the
aged  65-and-above;  T and  TT are trend variables;  1 percent level.  The parameter  for the population
and  sE is  the  error  term.  The  demand  parameter  variable Z. has the expected  sign and  is significant
b=l/al.  at the 5 percent level. The parameters on the trend
The  parameter  estimates  of  the  own-price  variables  T and  TT also take their expected  signs
(Pt),  cross-price  (0,),  and  income  variables  (Yt)  and are significant at the  1 percent level. In terms
are expected to have negative,  positive,  and posi-  of  diagnostics,  the  Durbin-Watson  ratio  is
tive  signs respectively, while the population vari-  1.53441,  with a p-value  of 0.021401,  which indi-
able (Z.) is expected to have a positive parameter.  cates  that,  at  the  2.1  percent  significance  level,
The inclusion of the latter variable  is justified  on  the null  hypothesis  of no  autocorrelation  cannot
the  grounds  that,  while  the  total  population  of  be rejected.  As a further test for the existence  of
Germany was constant over the time period under  autocorrelation  in  the  residuals,  the  Box-Pierce
consideration, the population has been aging, and,  statistic  was calculated.4 The value of 8.895  with
therefore,  population  in  the  age  cohort  65-and-  6 degrees of freedom is less than the critical value
above  is  growing.  A  report  by  the  European  of X  =  10.64  at the  10  percent  level  of signifi-
Commission  (1976)  states  that  bananas  are  an  cance,  indicating  that  the  residuals  are  drawn
important  part of the diet of the sick and elderly.
The trend terms T and  TT are included  due to the
pThe  dd  t  s  andnt  v arie  inc  lexibt  the  Total  population  figures  were  available  for  every  year; plot of the  dependent  variable  Qt exhibiting  the  . r plot  of the dependet v  e  however, population for age 65-and-above, was reported as a
shape  of an  inverted  parabola,  hence,  it  is  ex-  percentage of total population every  five years. Other values
pected that  T will have a negative  parameter, and  were interpolated.
TT a positive parameter.  P  ^ 2
Annual  data  on  aggregate  quantities  of ba-  4  The Box-Pierce statistic is  defined as  B = T  l Pj where Annual  data  on  aggregate  quantities  of ba-  j=\^j
nanas  imported  into  Germany  (Qt),  retail  prices
(P.), and  import  prices  (M)2  were  collected  for  T is the sample size, pj are the estimated  autocorrelation
coefficients from the autocorrelation function,j is a given lag
and P the total number of lags. B is distributed approximately
2  Import price refers to the f.o.b. price charged by importers  as x  with P degrees of freedom (see Pindyck and Rubinfeld
to wholesalers  at the port of Hamburg.  (1981).Deodhar  and  Sheldon  Estimation of Imperfect Competition in Food  Marketing  5
from a white-noise series.  values of exports of the other multinational firms
It  should  be  noted  at this  point that  initial  qjtl, i ￿j.  Quantities of bananas  exported to Ger-
estimation  of  (6)  indicated  that  neither  the  pa-  many by the individual multinational  firms were
rameter for the price of oranges O, nor that for the  not available  directly;  however, market  shares  of
income variable  Yt  were  statistically  significant.5 multinational firms  in the German  banana market
As  a  result  these  explanatory  variables  were  were  available  for  the  years  1973  to  1989  and
dropped from the final estimation of (6). The sta-  were  applied  to  total  German  imports  to  give
tistical insignificance  of these variables is perhaps  shares  of the  market  at  the  firm  level.6 These
not  surprising.  As  reported  by  the  World  Bank  market  shares  were  collected  from  International
(1985),  the cross-price  elasticity of bananas  with  Fruit  World  (1988),  and  the  FAO  publications,
other fruits is very low. It is reported as 0 in Ger-  World Banana Economy (1983,  1986).
many, which is similar to estimates for other  de-  As  noted  earlier, matrix  G gives  a  relation-
veloped  countries,  e.g.  Huang  (1993)  reports  a  ship  between  qt and  qtl given  by q,  = Gqtj. To
value of 0.08 for the cross price elasticity between  recover  matrix  G, this  relationship  is  estimated
bananas  and oranges  in the United  States.  Thus,  using Zellner's  (1962)  seemingly  unrelated equa-
the choice of bananas  in  consumption  is a matter  tions  (SURE)  method.  The  model  requires  re-
of customer  preference,  and  other  fruits  are  not  stricting  the elements  of the  G matrix  such  that
accepted  as  ready  substitutes.  The  World  Bank  the own  lagged coefficients  (gl) are the same for
(1985)  also  reports  that  banana  consumption  is  the  three  firms,  and  lagged  coefficients  for  the
only responsive to income  in countries where  per  other  firms (g2)  are the same  for the three  firms.
capita  GNP  is  less  than  $1500.  In countries  like  The  F  statistic  for  imposing these  restrictions  is
Germany,  with  a  very  high  per  capita  income,  1.6,  and  the critical  value  for testing the restric-
banana  consumption has  reached  saturation  level  tions, F(7,36)  is 2.3  at the  5  percent  significance
with respect to income variations.  level.  Therefore,  the  restrictions  cannot  be  re-
jected.  Since the restrictions  are not rejected, they
Table 1. Estimation of the Demand Function.  are imposed,  and the regression  equations  are re-
Qt=  789  - 0.33PJ  +  98Z  - 80T"  +  4.3TT**  estimated, the results being presented in Table 2.
(1.48)  (-5.09)  (1.79)  (-11.4)  (14.0)
R-square between observed and predicted = 0.95  Calculation  of Vand 6 and  Hypothesis Testing
Durbin-Watson  statistic = 1.53441
Durbin-Watson p-value = 0.021401  Using the estimates  of b  and G,  the conjec-
Box-Pierce statistic = 8.895  tural  variations  parameter  V and  the  cost of ad-
Note: Figures in parenthesis refer to t ratios  justment  parameter  8  were  calculated  for  the
Significant at the 1 percent level  open-loop  and feedback models,  the results being
Significant at the 5 percent level  shown  in  Table  3.  The  subscripts  of V and 5,  o
Estimation of  Markov Equation  andf, refer to the open-loop  and  feedback  strate- Estimation of  Markov Equation gies  respectively,  and  the  superscript  c  refers  to
As well  as estimating  b, the  dynamic  model  classical  estimates,  named  as such  to distinguish As well as estimating b, the dynamic model o r  s e  o  a  s  o  M  them  from  the  bootstrap  estimates  that  are  dis- also  requires  estimation  of a  system  of Markov  _  i  c  - cussed  subsequently.  Standard  errors  are
equations,  one  for  each  firm,  where  the  banana
exports  of  the  three  multinational  firms  qit,  exports  of  the  three  multinational  firms  *qi  6  It should be noted that the years  1990-1992  were character- i=1,.,3, are regressed on the lagged values of their i=l ,.,3,  are regressed on the lagged values of their  ized by  an  unusual  export  trend  generated  by  expectations
own  exports  qit-!  to  Germany  and  the  lagged  about  the EU's  common  import policy for  bananas.  By the
end  of 1992,  the  EU  was  deliberating  on  setting  common
5  The estimated equation including O, and Y, was as follows:  quotas  and  tariffs  on  banana  imports.  In  light  of this,  the
= -140 -0.28P, + 0.030, + 36.4Y, + 94.04Z, -98.03T+ 4.137T  banana  multinationals  started  exporting  large  amounts  of
(-0.15)  (-3.4)  (0.33)  (1.23)  (1.76)  (-6.19)  (9.5)  bananas to  the EU,  expecting  that the level  of quotas would
R-square  between  observed  and  predicted  = 0.96,  Durbin-  be influenced by the amounts imported  in recent years. Thus,
Watson = 1.45.  recent exports of bananas  do not reflect  strategic  interaction
Exclusion  of T and  TT from this  equation  does  not improve  of firms,  but the  result  of an  anticipated  exogenous  policy
the explanatory power of 0,  and  Y,.  change.6  October 1996  Journal  of Food  Distribution  Research
Table 2. Banana Export Adjustment (Markov) Equation.
Bonita: qln  Chiquita: q2t  Dole: q3t
Time trend  2.43  3.85  2.36
(6.10)  (5.20)  (4.95)
Own lagged exports (gl)  0.85376  0.85376  0.85376
(22.97)  (22.97)  (22.97)
Lagged exports of other firms (g2)  -0.03485  -0.03485  -0.03485
(-3.22)  (-3.22)  (-3.22)
R-square  0.97  0.83  0.51
Durbin's h  -1.53  1.15  1.47
Note:  Figures in parenthesis refer to t ratios
Table 3. Classical Estimates of Dynamic Model.
0.08  0.187  0.20  0.191
(0.36)  --  (0.33)  --
Hypothesis  Test Statistic  Remark
Ho: Vc  = -0.5, H1: V  > -0.5  1.60  Cannot reject Ho at 5% or 1%.
Ho: Vc  = 0, H1: V"  X  0  0.22  Cannot reject Ho at any level.
Ho: Vg = 1, Hi: V<  <1  2.50  Reject Ho at any level.
Ho:V  Y  = -0.5, Hi:V>  -0.5  22.13  Reject Ho at 5% & 2.5%.
Ho: Vf = 0, HI: V" ￿  0  0.60  Cannot reject Ho at any level.
Ho: V  =1, Hi: V} < 1  2.42  Reject Ho at 5%  and 1%.
Note:  Figures in parenthesis  are standard errors
Table 4. Bootstrapping  of Dynamic Model.
Open-loop  Feedback
Mean values of Vand 6  VOB =0.06,  VB  =0.22  V  =0.17,  8B =0.23 V0 6~=0.22  f  f
Standard error  0.33,  0.13  0.30, 0.13
Values  Unstable  0.2%  0.2%
rejected  8 <0  2.8%  0.0%
because  V<-0.5  2.8%  2.8%
V>  1  8.7%  8.7%
1000 iterations performed of 8 are also calculated based on bootstrapping.Deodhar  and  Sheldon  Estimation of Imperfect Competition in Food  Marketing  7
Table 5. Hypothesis  Testing for Bootstrapped Vand 6.
Hypothesis  t-ratio  Remark
Ho: V  = -0.5, H1: V  > -0.5  1.70  Reject Ho at 5%.
Ho: VB  = 0, Hi:  VB  ￿  0  0.17  Cannot reject Ho.
Ho:  -B  = 1, HI: VB  < 1  -2.90  Reject Ho at any level.
Ho: 6B  = 0, Hi: 6  > 0  1.74  Reject Ho at 5%.
Ho::  = -0.5, H1:  > -0 5  2.20  Reject Ho at 5%  and 2.5%.
Ho: VB  = 0, Hi: VB  ￿  0  0.56  Cannot reject Ho.
Ho: V"  = 1, Hi:  Vf  <1  -2.70  Reject Ho at all levels.
Ho O6  = 0, Hi:  8f > 0  1.76  Reject Ho at 5%.
calculated  for  V  using  the  Taylor  expansion  timates  of  V  and  5  are  derived.  While  the  esti-
method.7 The results  show  that both  values  of  V  mates of V are  a little lower than  in the classical
are positive,  however, the hypothesis of Cournot-  case,  their  relative  position  is  maintained.  The
Nash behavior cannot be rejected. The hypothesis  standard errors of V show a similar pattern.  Also,
of collusive behavior  is rejected  for both types of  the values  of 8  are  higher  than  in  the  classical
firm behavior,  and  that of perfect  competition  is  case, but their relative position is maintained.  The
rejected  only  in  the case  of feedback  strategies.  standard  errors  of 8 are  also calculated  based  on
Interestingly,  the  estimate  of V for the  feedback  bootstrapping  the Markov  equations that generate
case (0.20) is larger than both the open-loop value  multiple values of  g  and g2.
(0.08)  and,  also,  the  equivalent  static  value  de-  Finally, the  results  of hypothesis  tests  con-
rived by Deodhar and Sheldon (1995).  ducted for the bootstrap estimates  of V and 8  are
As  an  alternative  to  the  classical  estimates  presented  in  Table  5.  In  the  classical  case,  the
derived  from  the  Taylor  expansion,  a  bootstrap  hypothesis  of  perfect  competition  was  not  re-
procedure  can  also  be  utilized  (Efron,  1979).  jected  in  the  case  of open-loop  behavior,  but  it
Bootstrapping  was  performed  by  resampling  the  was rejected for feedback behavior. In the case of
original  data  with  replacement  (Freedman  and  the  bootstrap  estimates,  perfect  competition  is
Peters,  1984). In the present context, this involves  rejected  under  both  open-loop  and  feedback  be-
bootstrapping  the Markov equation,  and  generat-  havior.  The  hypothesis  of collusive  behavior  is
ing numerous  values  of gl and g2. These values,  also rejected in both cases. Only the hypothesis of
in turn,  are used to calculate  V and  6,  along with  Cournot-Nash  behavior  is not rejected.  Again the
their mean values and standard  errors. The results  feedback estimate of V (0.17)  is greater than both
of this procedure  are given  in Table  4, where  su-  the open-loop estimate (0.06) and, also, the corre-
perscript  B  refers  to  the bootstrap  estimate.  Re-  sponding  static  value  reported  by  Deodhar  and
sampling and regressing the data 1000 times with  Sheldon (1995). For both behavioral  assumptions,
replacement,  the inequality restrictions  on gl and  the  hypothesis  of 8=0  was  rejected.  This  shows
g2, and  V and  6  are imposed, and  constrained es-  that,  even  though the  absolute  value  of the  pa-
rameter is  small,  it is statistically significant,  and
the costs of adjustment  in banana  production  are
7 We  benefitted  from  an  e-mail  discussion  with  Professor  important
Perloff on how  to  employ the  Taylor expansion  method to
calculate  the standard  error of V,  and  he kindly  made  avail-  Implications
able a copy of his original program.
8  Bootstrapping is a computer intensive nonparametric  ap-  This  paper  has  focused  on  estimating  the
proach to statistical inference based on  data resampling. A  degree  of  market  imperfection  in  the  German
good treatment of it is found in Judge et al. (1988).8  October 1996  Journal  ofFood  Distribution  Research
market  for  banana  exports.  Using  a  linear-  domestic  prices compared to the effects  of a tar-
quadratic dynamic oligopoly model, the degree of  iff.
market  imperfection  was  estimated.  Using  a  The  results  presented  in  this  paper  suggest
bootstrapping  procedure,  the  maintained  hy-  that  raising  non-tariff  barriers  to  the  German
pothesis  of perfect  competition  is rejected,  how-  market  has probably  not altered the  strategic  be-
ever, the hypothesis that firms  operate in a Cour-  havior of firms by very much as firms are already
not-Nash  fashion  cannot be  rejected. In  fact,  the  behaving oligopolistically,  and, therefore,  the in-
classical  and  bootstrap  estimates  of the dynamic  crease in banana prices in Germany is what would
feedback  conjectural  variations  parameter  (0.20  have  likely  occurred  under  an  equivalent  tariff.
and 0.17)  are  larger than the corresponding  static  Our  study also  shows  that the  estimation  of the
value  derived in  a previous study of the German  degree  of  market  imperfection  depends  on  the
banana  import  market  by  Deodhar  and  Sheldon  intertemporal  strategic  interaction  among  market
(1995).  Further,  the  estimates  of the  adjustment  participants,  and, therefore,  dynamic models need
parameter  6  in  the  dynamic  model  are  signifi-  to  be  employed  for  the  estimation  of  market
cantly different  from  zero,  suggesting that  a dy-  power. It also reinforces the importance of view-
namic  model  is  more  appropriate  for  analyzing  ing  firms  as  being  involved  in  repeated  rather
the market for a commodity such as bananas.  than static games.
These results have important implications for  Ap
analysis of the welfare effects of the implementa-
tion of the common EU banana import regime. In  Solving the open-loop modelfor V and  6
the  case  of Germany,  an  effective  import  quota
has  been  implemented  in  that  market  (Read,  The first-order-condition  restriction from  (3)
1994).  When evaluating  the impact of a quota, it  is given as:
is  crucial  to  estimate  how  noncompetitive  the
market  was  under  free  trade.  Import  quotas  can  K V  = [G-(I  - G)(I - PG]' ei
affect  the  strategic  behavior  of firms  in  such  a
way  as to make its  impact  non-equivalent  to that  Imposing  the  symmetry  conditions,  and  expand-
of a tariff in terms of domestic  price effects  (see  g  3):
McCorriston and Sheldon,  1996). Most economic
studies,  however,  of  the  implementation  of  a 
common EU banana import regime have assumed
that the market  is perfectly  competitive  in  struc-  b 0 0  V  Z(3x3)  0
ture (see  Borrell and  Yang,  1990,  1992;  Borrell,  b0 0  V  0
1994).  Our  results  show that  this  assumption  is
questionable.  where Z is a symmetric matrix, and 4i is assumed
The  welfare  effects  of  implementing  trade  to be  0, which  implies  that marginal cost  is con-
instruments  such as quotas are  likely to be highly  stant.  The  matrices  are  multiplied  to obtain  two
sensitive to the underlying game being played by  equations:
firms.  For example,  Krishna  (1989)  predicts that  b = Z2 ,16
firms  adjust  from  Bertrand-Nash  to  more  collu-  2b + 2bV= Z1,16
sive  behavior  after  implementation  of  a  quota.  b 
Hwang  and  Mai  (1988)  have  also  shown  in  a  =-  ,andV=  - 1
conjectural  variations  model that  quantitative  re-  Z2,1  2  2,
straints  such  as  quotas  and  voluntary  export re-
straints  can cause  either pro-  or anti-competitive  Solving thefeedback modelfor Vand 6
effects,  or neither,  depending on the initial values
of  the  firms'  conjectures,  i.e.  how  (un)com-  The first-order-condition restriction from (5) is:
petitive the market was prior to the imposition of
the  quota.  In  turn,  this  either  exacerbates  or  [Ki +  i + (eie'i + PXi)i]'Vi+G'-le  i - yi5  i
dampens the effect of a quantitative restriction onDeodhar  and Sheldon  Estimation of Imperfect Competition in Food  Marketing  9
Under  the  assumption  of symmetry,  the rank  of  FAO.  World  Banana  Economy:  Statistical  Compendium.
the matrices  in the above equations is two, and we  Rome: FAO,  1983.
FAO.  The  World  Banana  Economy.  1970-1984.  Rome:
need to look  only  at the first two  equations.  De-  FAO  o  o 
fine matrix A' and B' so that Ba' - Ki +  Wi and B'  FAO. Banana Statistics. Rome:  FAO, 1992.
eiei' +  Xi. The l  andjh equation is:  FAO. Production Yearbook. Rome:  FAO, various issues.
Fershtman,  C.  and  M.R.  Kamien.  "Dynamic  Duopolistic
Competition  with  Sticky  Prices." Econometrica, 1987:
bNAii  + V  I  A  +  Bii  + V  1151-1164. b^Aii  +  V  AyJ  +  jBi  +  V  E  Bij  °=  yii  Freedman,  D.A.  and  S.C.  Peters.  "Bootstrapping  an
1J'  J*I  J  \]fEconometric  Model:  Some Empirical  Results." Journal
of Business and Economic  Statistics, 10(1984):  150-
and  158.
Fudenberg,  D. and J. Tirole.  "Noncooperative  Game  Theory
for  Industrial  Organization:  An  Introduction  and
/.+  AI(  +/qt  Ii{  +  _  ~  ~~  Overview,"  in  Handbook  of Industrial  Organization,
b  Al  Aki  +  VBiAdy)  +  ^  DBkV  Yik-  edited  by R.  Schmalensee  and  R.  Willig, North Hol-
land: Amsterdam,  1989.
Helpman,  E.  and  P.R.  Krugman.  Trade  Policy  and  Market
where Ay, By and yii are elements of A', B' and y i. Structure, MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.,  1989.
Solving the  second  equation  gives  6  as  a  linear  Huang,  K.S.  "A  Complete  System  of  U.S.  Demand  for
Food."  ERS  Technical  Bulletin,  1821.  Washington,
function of b and  a nonlinear  function of V. Sub-  F  ." ES  T  B  ,  . ,
D.C.: USDA,  1993.
stituting  the  value  of  S  into  the  first  equation  Hwang, H. and  C.  Mai.  "On  the Equivalence  of Tariffs  and
gives a quadratic  in V that is independent of b. Of  Quotas Under Duopoly." Journal  of International  Eco-
the two roots of V, one is closer to the open-loop  nomics, 24(1988): 373-380.
solution,  and the other falls outside the theoretical  International  Labour  Office.  From  Pyramid  to  Pillar.  ILO:
range.  Therefore, the feasible root is  picked. Here,  Geneva,1989. range. Therefore,  the feasible root is picked. Here,  International  Monetary  Fund. International  Financial  Statis-
V is a function of 13  and G, and  5  is a function of  tics Yearbook.  Washington, D.C.: IMF,  1992.
b, P  and G.  International  Monetary  Fund. International  Financial  Statis-
tics, Jan. 94. Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1994.
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